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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
v. 
DONALD HYLAND KEITZ, 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 920558-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA IS AN APPROPRIATE 
PROCEDURE TO REVIEW THE DENIAL OF A 
PRETRIAL ENTRAPMENT MOTION. 
Appellee argues that it is inappropriate to enter a conditional guilty plea and 
appeal a pretrial ruling of an entrapment motion. The basis for appellee's position is 
the contention that entrapment is a substantive defense subject to a jury's 
determination. A close reading of the entrapment statute and interpretive case law 
lead to the conclusion that the procedure employed by appellee was appropriate. 
The critical aspects of the entrapment statute with respect to this issue are 
found in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(4) and (5K1953 as amended). Those portions 
of the statute provide: 
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court 
shall hear evidence on the issue and shall determine as a 
1 
matter of fact and law whether the defendant was 
entrapped to commit the offense. Defendant's motion shall 
be made at least ten days before trial except the court for 
good cause shown may permit a later filing. 
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant 
was entrapped, it shall dismiss the case with prejudice, but 
if the court determines the defendant was not entrapped, 
such issue may be presented by the defendant to the jury 
at trial. Any order by the court dismissing a case based on 
entrapment shall be appealable by the state. 
Entrapment differs from other substantive defenses in that the Utah statute mandates 
that a written motion be filed prior to trial and that the court determine as "... as a 
matter of fact and law whether the defendant was entrapped...". None of the other 
defenses to criminal responsibility1 or justifications excluding criminal responsibility2 
require such a pretrial determination. The other important aspect of the statute is that 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(5) (1953 as amended) does not mandate that the 
entrapment issue be presented to the jury should the trial court deny the pretrial 
motion. 
Appellee describes this initial pretrial determination of the entrapment issue as 
a "gate keeping function."3 That is not what Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(4) (1953 
as amended) requires. That statue requires that the trial court make the initial 
determination of an entrapment issue as a matter of fact and law. Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court of Utah has cautioned trial courts against abdicating their roles in the 
1Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-301 et. seq. (1953 as amended). 
2Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-401 et. sea. (1953 as amended). 
3Brief of appellee at p. 17. 
2 
pretrial decision making process when a jury will make a similar determination at trial. 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 778-779 (Utah 1991). 
The pre-trial determination that is to be made with respect to entrapment is 
very similar to issues relating to the admissibility of evidence. That decision is 
whether the actions of law enforcement agents bar further prosecution of a criminal 
defendant. The mere fact that the same issue may be presented to a jury should not 
preclude the entry of a conditional plea and an appellate review of the pretrial ruling. 
Appellee cites State v. Udell. 728 P.2d 131 (Utah 1986), and State v. Salmon, 612 
P.2d 366 (Utah 1980), for the proposition that the initial denial of an entrapment 
motion is "... a provisional assessment that the question should be resolved at trial."4 
In both Udell and Salmon the issue that was raised on appeal was whether the 
conduct of law enforcement officers constituted entrapment as a matter of law. In 
both of those cases the court ruled that there was no entrapment as a matter of law. 
The court then went on to state in those cases it was proper to present the 
entrapment issue to the jury. Neither of those cases go so far as to require that the 
entrapment issue be presented to a jury if the pretrial motion is denied. 
Appellee argues that State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), allows 
the entry of a conditional plea and taking of an appeal only as to issues relating to the 
admissibility of evidence. A number of the policies that justify such a procedure and 
the authorities that permit similar procedures are not so limited. The primary policy 
reason for allowing the procedure in Sery was judicial economy. The procedure that 
4Brief of appellee at 14. 
3 
was allowed in Sery saved the time and expense of a trial when the critical legal issue 
related to the admissibility of the evidence to be introduced at that trial. The court 
had no problems with a procedure that allowed a defendant to admit guilt, then 
claim on appeal that the government is barred from being able to prove its case due 
to an illegal search. 
One of the authorities cited by the court in Serv for allowing that procedure 
was Rule 11(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.5 The federal rule 
allows for a conditional guilty plea that reserves the right to review "any specified 
pretrial motion." The federal procedures do not provide for a pretrial entrapment 
determination. However, the federal rule has not been limited to the review of 
evidentiary suppression issues.6 A pretrial ruling such as that required by the Utah 
entrapment statute would certainly be subject to appellate review under the federal 
rule. The substance of an entrapment determination is whether the government is 
barred from convicting an individual based on the misconduct of its agents. The 
5F.R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2) provides: 
Conditional Pleas. With the approval of the court and the 
consent of the government, a defendant may enter a 
conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in 
writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to review of 
the adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion. 
A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to 
withdraw the plea. 
6United States v. Yasak, 884 F.2d 996 (7th Cir. 1989) (Review of motion to 
dismiss information); United States v. Ballester. 763 F.2d 368 (9th Cir) cert, denied 
474 U.S. 842 (1985) (Review of motion to dismiss based on prosecutorial 
misconduct.) 
4 
policy of allowing an appeal of the entrapment issue also provides for judicial economy 
by allowing the review of the legal issue without a trial. 
Appellee contends that procedurally when a criminal defendant pleads guilty he 
is conceding the absence of entrapment. It is then claimed that a defendant should 
not than be able to claim on appeal that he was entrapped into committing the 
offense. In making this argument appellee disregards the unique procedures required 
to raise entrapment in Utah. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(4) (1953 as amended) 
mandates a pretrial legal and factual determination of the entrapment issue. If 
entrapment could be raised only as a trial defense then appellee's argument may have 
merit. Furthermore, when a criminal defendant claims entrapment, there is generally 
a concession of one's guilt to the charged offense. Consequently, there is no 
inconsistency in pleading guilty and admitting the commission of a criminal offense 
and allowing the review of a claim of entrapment. 
Finally, appellee claims that the use of a conditional plea to review a pretrial 
entrapment ruling would violate the separation of powers requirement of the Utah 
Constitution.7 In making this argument appellee contends that the Utah legislature 
has determined of how entrapment questions may reach the appellate courts.8 This 
argument is based on a misconstruction of the entrapment statute. That statute does 
not require that there be a jury determination of entrapment before that issue may be 
reviewed on appeal. In fact the opposite is true. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(4) 
7Utah Constitution Article V. Section 1. 
8Brief of appellee at p. 15. 
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(1953 as amended) mandates a pretrial determination of the entrapment issue. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-202(5) (1953 as amended) is permissive on whether the entrapment 
issue be presented to the jury. That provision would allow a defendant to raise the 
entrapment issue prior to trial, not use it as a defense at trial, then raise it as an issue 
to be reviewed on appeal. Consequently, there is no separation of powers problem 
involved in the procedure employed in the instant case. This is because an 
entrapment issue may be raised on appeal even though it was not presented to the 
trier of fact. 
The procedure employed in the instant case is appropriate to raise an 
entrapment issue for appellate review. This is due to the unique procedural aspects 
of the Utah statue. If this court feels that the procedure that was employed is 
improper with respect to the entrapment issue, the appropriate remedy is to remand 
the case to the district court, allow appellant to withdraw his conditional guilty plea 
and proceed to trial. This is because the procedure of entering a conditional pleas to 
appeal a pretrial entrapment ruling has been allowed in the past, State v. Richardson. 
P.2d , 201 U.A.R. 40 (Utah App. 1992), and appellant should not be prejudiced 
by a change in procedures. 
POINT II 
THE POLICE ACTIONS WERE OUTSIDE REASONABLE 
BOUNDS REQUIRING A FINDING THAT APPELLANT WAS 
ENTRAPPED INTO POSSESSING MARIJUANA. 
Appellee argues that the standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence 
should be employed in the appellate review of a pretrial ruling on entrapment. In State 
6 
v. Kourbelas. 621 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1980), the court described that the standard of 
review and stated, if 
reasonable minds acting fairly on the evidence should 
necessarily have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's 
guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal. 
621 P.2d at 1240. In Kourbelas the court also stated that while in engaging in this 
review the appellate court must give "...all proper deference to the rulings of the trial 
court, and to the findings of the jury" Id. at 1240. 
State v. Thurman. _ P . 2 d _ . 203 U.A.R. 18 (Utah 1992), involved a lengthy 
discussion of the standard of appellate review for pretrial motions. The court held 
that factual determinations must be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. The 
determination of how those facts are applicable to a legal standard is reviewed for 
correctness. The clearly erroneous standard and the standard for review of jury 
factual findings are essentially the same. Thurman does add the requirement that 
pretrial legal rulings be reviewed for correctness. Such a two step procedure should 
be applied in this case. 
With respect to the entrapment determination, appellee argues that the Utah 
appellate courts consistently do not overturn convictions based on entrapment issues 
unless there are high pressure tactics or appeals to extreme vulnerability by police 
agents. That standard has not been employed in the Utah courts. In fact, in State 
v. UdelL supra, the court noted that in the appellate review of an entrapment issue 
the court must determine whether the police conduct "... was within reasonable 
bounds...." 728 P.2d at 133. 
7 
The case law dealing with what constitutes or does not constitute entrapment 
was discussed at length in appellant's opening brief.9 In this case the critical facts 
included: The development of a personalized relationship between appellant and 
Burchette over a nine month period. That relationship was independent of drug sales 
or drug use. There were sexual overtones to the relationship. Burchette believed that 
she could offer sexual favors in exchange for drugs. The marijuana was sold to the 
defendant by the agent. Burchette made requests to purchase drugs from appellant 
and no such purchases were made. Finally, appellant lacked the financial resources 
to complete the transaction. 
The police actions in this case went beyond reasonable bounds. Burchette did 
more than merely provide appellant with a opportunity to commit a crime. His criminal 
involvement was induced by the actions of the undercover police officer. The 
appellant's judgement and conviction should be reversed. This court should order that 
the charge against appellant be dismissed. 
POINT III 
THE ACTIONS OF THE POLICE OFFICERS IN THE INSTANT 
CASE VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW. 
A. Federal Analysis. 
The federal due process analysis was discussed in appellant's opening brief.10 
The argument on that issue is submitted on that brief. 
9See point I of appellant's opening brief; (pp.11-16). 
10Brief of appellant at pp. 16-18. 
8 
B. State Analysis. 
Appellee takes the position that a due process analysis for outrageous 
governmental conduct has been addressed by the legislature in the entrapment 
statute.11 In making this argument appellee describes at length how appellant failed 
to question the constitutionality of that statue. The issue raised by appellant is not 
whether the entrapment statute violates due process. Rather, the issue is whether 
the due process protections of Article I, Section 7, of the Utah Constitution provide 
greater or different protections than the entrapment statute or the federal due process 
protections. 
The entrapment statute requires a showing that a defendant was induced to 
commit a criminal offense and that the defendant was not predisposed to commit that 
offense. The due process analysis that appellant urges this court to adopt involves 
a four part test that originated in People v. Isaacson. 378 N.E.2.d 78 (N.Y. App. 
1978). The factors that the court require to be considered include: 
(1) whether the police manufactured a crime which 
otherwise would not likely have occurred, or merely 
involved themselves in an ongoing criminal activity 
[citations omitted]; (2) whether the police themselves 
engaged in criminal or improper conduct repugnant to a 
sense of justice [citations omitted]; (3) whether the 
defendant's reluctance to commit the crime is overcome by 
appeals to humanitarian instincts such as sympathy or past 
friendship, by temptation or exorbitant gain, or by 
persistent solicitation in the face of unwillingness [citations 
omitted]; and (4) whether the record reveals simply a desire 
to obtain a conviction with no reading that the police 
motive is to prevent further crime or protect the populace. 
11Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303(1 )(1953 as amended). 
378 N.E. 2.d at 83. The first and third factors descried in the Isaacson test are 
covered in the Utah entrapment statute and its interpretive case law. The second and 
fourth factors are not factors that would be considered in an entrapment analysis. 
However, those factors are properly considered in determining if there has been a due 
process violation. 
The reasons why a state due process analysis that differs from the federal 
analysis should be adopted were described in appellant's opening brief.12 Those 
reasons were not contested by appellee. The application of the facts of this case to 
the analysis from Isaacson was also covered in appellant's opening brief.13 That 
analysis also was not challenged in appellee's brief. Appellee does attempt to 
distinguish the case at bar from the facts in State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062 (Utah 
1988). Colonnna is distinguishable, but for different reasons than were given by 
appellee. 
In Colonna the court declined to adopt the due process analysis described in 
Isaacson. The defendant in Colonna was convicted of aggravated robbery. The 
incident took place after an undercover narcotics agent met the defendant and others. 
The agent provided drugs and alcohol then consumed them with the defendant. 
Following a discussion about the victim the agent drove the defendant to the victim's 
residence. At that residence the victim was beaten by both the defendant and the 
agent. The victim's property was also taken. The court in Colonna did not adopt the 
12Appellant's opening brief at pp. 18-20. 
13Appellant's opening brief at pp. 23-24. 
10 
due process analysis from Colonna because the agent did not initiate the criminal 
actions. The case at bar is distinguishable from Colonna. the agent did initiate the 
criminal activity. She built a friendship with appellant over a nine month period that 
was coupled with flirtations acts, sexual innuendos and sexual overtones. There was 
no indication that appellant was engaged in any large scale drug sales or purchases 
other than that initiated by the undercover agent. She requested that appellant sell 
the drugs, which he did not do. Finally, she sold the marijuana to the appellant. 
This court should adopt the due process analysis from Isaacson as a 
requirement of Article I Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. In doing so, this court 
should enter a finding that the actions of the undercover agent in this case violated 
Article I, Section 7. Based on that finding the charge of possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute should be dismissed. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
A. Harmless Error 
Appellee first contends that any error in refusing to suppress the evidence 
seized from appellant's residence was harmless. When the claimed error is of 
constitutional magnitude, it must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Rose v. 
Clark. 478 U.S. 570 (1986). The only evidence that the substance seized from 
appellant's residence was in fact marijuana was the test result on the substance. 
Without further proof of the nature of the substance, the error in failing to grant the 
suppression motion would not be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
11 
Appellee also contends that the question relating to the search of appellant's 
workshop is moot. However, if this court orders that appellant may withdraw his 
guilty plea and proceed to trial, the paraphernalia charge would be reinstated. 
Furthermore, the scales seized from the workshop would be relevant to proof of the 
element of intent to distribute. Consequently, the issue of the search of the workshop 
is neither moot nor harmless error. 
B. Search Incident to Arrest. 
The first exception to the warrant requirement that appellee argues is that the 
search of appellant's residence was incident to an arrest. The facts with respect to 
this issue are uncontested. The seizure was made from a utility room in appellant's 
residence some ten to fifteen feet from where appellant was located. That time 
appellant was handcuffed and held at gunpoint. 
Appellee relies on State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 769 (Utah Aop.) cert, denied 817 
P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), to justify its claim that the seizure in this case was made from 
an area within appellant's immediate control. Harrison involved an arrest in public. 
That fact alone distinguishes Harrison from the instant case. The defendant in 
Harrison and his wife were walking their children at the time of his arrest. Both the 
defendant and his wife were ordered to the ground by police officers. A search of a 
diaper bag on the stroller that the defendant was pushing resulted in the discovery of 
a handgun that was used in a homicide. At the time of the search the defendant was 
detained in handcuffs about ten feet from the diaper bag. This court held that the bag 
12 
was sufficiently within the defendant's immediate control to constitute a search 
incident to arrest. 
As authority for the ruling in Harrison the court relied on several cases involving 
searches of vehicles incident to an arrest. New York v. Belton. 453 U.S. 454 (1981); 
State v. Kent. 665 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1983); and In re. K.K.C, 636 P.2d 1044 (Utah 
1981). The problem with relying that line of authority is that in Belton the court 
established what it described as a "bright line" rule for the search of vehicles incident 
to the arrest of a driver. In that situation, the Court held that an arrest of a driver of 
a vehicle would enable police officers to search the passenger compartment without 
regard to what area was actually within the defendant's immediate control. 
The holding in Harrison that the search was properly done as incident to an 
arrest was erroneous14. A criticism of similar holdings on the issue of searches 
incident to arrest has been made by Professor Wayne LeFave. He stated, 
Most common, however is the tendency to view every 
arrestee as a combination acrobat and Houdini who might 
well free himself from his restraints and suddenly gain 
access to some distant place.15 
That same criticism is applicable to the position that appellee urges this court to take 
with respect to the search conducted in the instant case. 
Professor LeFave also felt that when a court addresses the search incident to 
arrest exception to the warrant requirement: 
14The result in that case was not erroneous as the search was also justified as an 
inventory search. 805 P.2d at 785. 
15LeFave, Search and Seizure § 6.3 (c) at p. 628 (West 1987). 
13 
.... the relevant facts are those which show (i) what places 
it would be possible for the arrestee presently to reach, and 
(ii), perhaps of somewhat lesser importance, how probable 
it \s that the arrestee would undertake to seek means of 
resistance or escape or to destroy evidence.[footnote 
omitted, emphasis in the original.]16 
Those were the facts addressed in State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 1983). In that 
case, the court held that marijuana plants were improperly seized from the defendant's 
back yard subsequent to his arrest. The defendant was in custody and there was no 
potential that the evidence could be concealed or destroyed. 
For the appellant to have gained access to the marijuana that was seized in this 
case, he would have had to slip out of the handcuffs, enter an adjoining room some 
ten feet away, grab a package containing approximately one pound of vegetable 
material and conceal or destroy its contents. This all would have to be done without 
detection by the two officers who were holding the appellant at gunpoint. The 
combination acrobat and Houdini described by Professor LaFave could not have 
accomplished those feats. The seizure of the evidence cannot be justified as a search 
incident to arrest. The object of the search was not only out of appellant's immediate 
control, but it would have been physically impossible for him to obtain control over 
it. 
The other reason that the search should not be justified as incident to arrest is 
that it was not in fact made incident to an arrest. Upon entry into the house the 
officers immediately asked Burchette where the marijuana was located. She pointed 
Id at 629-630. 
14 
it out to them and it was seized. The officers were not removing objects from those 
areas where appellant may obtain possession of them. The evidence seized as a 
result of the warrantless search must be ordered suppressed. 
C. Inevitable Discovery. 
The other justification for the warrantless search argued by appellee is 
inevitable discovery. Appellee contends that the officers arresting appellant would 
have been entitled to make a "protective sweep" of the residence. The purpose of 
such a sweep is to protect the safety of the officers who are effecting the arrest. 
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990). During such a sweep, it is argued, the 
package containing the marijuana would have been discovered. The problems with 
this argument are that it is not justified under the facts of this case and it was not 
raised in the district court. 
The cases where a protective sweep has been upheld involve situations where 
the police were making an arrest or interviewing a suspect in a residence where they 
did not know if others were present. In Maryland v. Buie. supra, the officers were 
executing an arrest warrant for the defendant who was charged with armed robbery. 
He was located in the basement of a house. The officers did not know if other people 
were in the house or in the basement. The officers were concerned about their safety 
while making the arrest. During a cursory search of the area, the officers observed 
clothing that was worn during the robbery. The Supreme Court in Buie allowed 
officers to make a search of areas adjoining the arrest from which an attack may be 
launched. For a further sweep of a residence, the Court held that an articulable 
15 
suspicion that others were in the residence who may have endangered the officers is 
necessary. 
The Utah cases that have allowed protective sweeps both involved situations 
where the officers entered residences not knowing who or what was inside. In State 
v. Kellv. 718 P.2d 385 (Utah 1986), officers investigating a homicide followed tracks 
in the snow from the scene of the crime to the defendant's residence. The officers 
began to question the defendant. When the defendant requested to put on some 
clothes the officers followed him into a bedroom where incriminating evidence was 
observed. The court allowed the officers to accompany the defendant to the bedroom 
to protect their own safety. Similarly, in State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987), 
narcotics officers were making a drug purchase. They had followed the seller to the 
location of his supplier. The seller was arrested and the officers went to the residence 
where the supplier was located. The court held that exigent circumstances allowed 
the officers to enter the supplier's residence. The court also allowed the officers to 
conduct a cursory check of the residence to protect their own safety and to prevent 
evidence from being destroyed or concealed. 
In this case, Burchette testified that she knew that there were no others in 
appellant's house. The other agents involved in the arrest and search had held 
surveillance on the house. There was no indication that they had observed 
automobiles or others at the residence that would cause them to have concern for 
their safety. These facts distinguish the case at bar from Buie. Kellv. and Ashe. A 
protective sweep cannot be justified where the officer where the officers had no 
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articulable facts that would lead to a belief that their lives or the lives of others may 
be in danger. Furthermore, the officers should not be allowed to create a situation 
which gives rise to an exigent circumstance requiring a protective sweep.17 
Although the Fourth Amendment as interpreted in Buie would allow officers to 
look into areas immediately adjoining the place of arrest, such a search in this case 
would be unreasonable. Neither this court nor the Utah Supreme Court has ruled on 
the issue of whether Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution allows 
suspicionless searches or detentions.18 However, in the context of roadblock stops 
several state courts have indicated that officers must have at least an articulable 
suspicion before detaining vehicle. Commonwealth v. Tarbert. 502 A.2d 221 (Pa. 
Super, 1985), State v. Henderson, 114 Ida. 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (Ida.1988); £tat£ 
v. Bovanovskv. 304 Or. 131, 743 P.2d 711 (Or. 1987) and State v. Parms, 523 So. 
2d 1293 (La. 1988). 
In the situation of a protective sweep, the officers should have a reasonable 
belief based on a specific and articulable facts that the area to be searched harbors 
an individual who poses a danger to the officer or others. In this case, there were no 
facts to justify such a sweep. Burchette had been in the house for some time during 
the transaction. She had no indication nor did the surveillance officers have any 
17See Point V. B. of Appellant's opening brief at pp. 28-33. 
18This state constitutional issue was not raised below because the state did not 
argue the protective sweep issue in the district court. 
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indication that others may be in the house. Consequently, a protective sweep would 
have been unreasonable under the facts of this case. 
The second reason for rejecting this inevitable discovery-protective sweep 
argument is that it was not raised by the state in the district court. A claim of error 
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. In State v Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132 
(Utah 1989), the court held that the defendant's lack of standing to contest a search 
may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Likewise, in State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 
656 (Utah 1985), the court held that he defendant could not contest the legality of 
a search when the only issue raised in the district court was the legality of the initial 
stop. 
In the case at bar the questions of inevitable discovery and the need for a 
protective sweep were not raised by the state in the district court. Legal and factual 
arguments were not presented to the trial judge. Findings or conclusions were not 
made by that judge. The waiver doctrine applies to the state as well as the 
defendant. Based on that doctrine, the inevitable discovery claim raised by appellee 
must be rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's conviction for the offense of possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute should be reversed. In addition to remanding this case to the 
district court this court should order that the charge be dismissed because the 
appellant was entrapped into committing the offense and because the undercover 
officers actions violated appellant's right to due process of law. In the alternative, a 
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new trial be ordered and the evidence seized from appellant's residence should be 
ordered suppressed. 
DATED this day of February, 1993. 
G. FRED METOS 
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